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FORCE-FEEDING PRETRIAL DETAINEES: A
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 685
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
A. Development of a Fundamental Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
B. Hunger Strikes and the Practice of Force-Feeding . . . . . . 690
C. Constitutional Rights Within the Prison System . . . . . . . 693
1. Courts Have Applied Rationality Standard of
Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 694
2. Legal Distinctions Between Prisoners and
Pretrial Detainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695
II. ADOPTING A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF SCRUTINY FOR 
INFRINGEMENTS UPON A PRETRIAL DETAINEE’S
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT NOT TO BE FORCE-FED. . . . . . . . . . . . 699
A. Force-Feeding Constitutes a Shocking Invasion of
Pretrial Detainees’ Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
B. The Government Should Be Required to Provide More
Proof of Its Interests in Force-Feeding Under a Heightened
Scrutiny Standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
1. Little Evidence Suggests that Force-Feeding Prevents 
Riots and Copycats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 704
2. The Availability of Bond as an Alternative to Confinement 
Undermines the Government’s Interest in Force-Feeding 
Detainees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706
3. Government Interest in Preserving a Detainee’s Life to 
Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709
III. FORCE-FEEDING AS PUNISHMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711
A. Force-Feeding Meets Traditional Punishment Objectives, 
Displaying Government’s Punitive Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711
1. Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 712
2. Finding of Scienter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 715
683
684 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:683
B. Excessive Nature of the Government Response Indicates that 
Force-Feeding Constitutes Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717
C. Court Hearings as Adjudication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722
2020] FORCE-FEEDING PRETRIAL DETAINEES 685
INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 2019, a federal judge granted United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) request for an
Emergency Temporary Restraining Order to force-feed Evgenii
Ivanov, a Russian detainee who had refused food for more than
two weeks.1 ICE did not disclose Ivanov’s reasons for striking.2
Instead, ICE proffered various reasons that Ivanov’s hunger strike
might result in serious injury and death, stating that the Gov-
ernment’s interests “clearly outweigh whatever interest [Ivanov]
has in pursuing a hunger strike.”3 After performing a cursory bal-
ancing test of Ivanov’s rights, the court held that ICE was likely to
succeed in proving this.4
Ivanov is one of many pretrial detainees who has gone on hunger
strike only to find that the government response is force-feeding. A
demonstration in El Paso, Texas, drew massive public pressure after
ICE employees engaged in force-feeding detainees.5 The Associated
Press reported that the detainees in El Paso were experiencing
nosebleeds and frequent vomiting as a result of the force-feeding.6
During one hearing, an ICE doctor testified that the process was
widely viewed as medically unethical and that “[t]here wouldn’t be
1. City News Serv., Judge Grants ICE Request to Force-Feed Detainee on Hunger
Strike, FOX 5 NEWS (Aug. 22, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://fox5sandiego.com/2019/08/22/judge-
grants-ice-request-to-force-feed-detainee-on-hunger-strike/ [https://perma.cc/E9HN-E9EY].
2. See id.
3. Ex parte Application for Emergency Temp. Restraining Ord. & Request for Expedited
Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 6, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration & Customs
Enf ’t v. Ivanov, No. 3:19-cv-01573-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2019).
4. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t v. Ivanov, No. 3:19-cv-01573-
DMS-MDD, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019) (granting plaintiff ’s ex parte application for
emergency restraining order).
5. ICE Stops Force-Feeding Immigrant Detainees, VOA NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019, 9:54 PM),
https://www.voanews.com/usa/immigration/ice-stops-force-feeding-immigrant-detainees
[https://perma.cc/TJY9-48PL].
6. Clara Long, ICE Force-Feeding Immigrant Detainees on Hunger Strike: Force-Feeding
Is Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 1, 2019, 9:22 AM), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2019/02/01/ice-force-feeding-immigrant-detainees-hunger-strike [https://perma.
cc/4HY3-942X].
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anyone in a hospital who would do it.”7 She then said ICE regula-
tions required the practice.8
Furthermore, hunger strikes are on the rise. Between January
and March of 2019, at least six hunger strikes were initiated at
detention centers, which represents an unprecedented increase in
frequency.9 As most strikes were initiated because detainees were
denied bond,10 increasing bond denials in immigration cases may
exacerbate the problem.11
ICE’s response here is predictable—requesting a court order to
force-feed.12 However, whether a judge issues such an order should
rely upon a nuanced balancing test acknowledging not only the
detainee’s constitutional right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition, but also the individual’s unique status as a pretrial
detainee. Instead, pretrial detainees have been analyzed like
convicted prisoners.13 Although this is particularly relevant in the
immigration detainment context, this argument is equally rele-
vant for any pretrial detainee.
This Note argues that the status of all pretrial detainees (wheth-
er detained pretrial or for immigration purposes) cannot be ignored
in this balancing framework. This status should afford detainees
heightened scrutiny, not the bare rationality review that is ordinar-
ily applied to convicted prisoners. Such heightened review would
protect the detainees’ due process rights—such as the fundamental
right to die and the detainee’s right not to be punished—while still
affording jails and prisons the latitude to address real security
threats. Part I will provide background regarding a person’s
fundamental right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition, the
7. Robert Moore, ICE Doctor Defends Force-Feeding Detainees on Hunger Strike as
‘Uncomfortable’ but Necessary, TEXASMONTHLY (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.texasmonthly.
com/news/ice-doctor-force-feeding-detainees-on-hunger-strike/ [https://perma.cc/3X9V-DZ83].
8. See id.
9. See Michael Issac Stein, Hunger Strikes at ICE Detention Centers Spread as Parole,
Bond Are Denied, NPR (Apr. 19, 2019, 8:43 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/19/713910647/
hunger-strikes-at-ice-detention-centers-spread-as-parole-bond-is-denied [https://perma.cc/
MS4B-L9NL].
10. See id. (“For several of the hunger strikes, the detainees’ central demand was to be
released while their cases were adjudicated.”).
11. See Applicability of INA to Matter of M-S-, 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 509, 519 n.8 (2019).
12. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION
STANDARDS 2011, at 256 (2016) [hereinafter PBNDS].
13. See infra Part I.C.2.
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history of force-feeding, the treatment of fundamental rights within
prisons, and the distinctions between pretrial detainees and pris-
oners. Part II will argue for a heightened standard of review for
the fundamental right when applied to pretrial detainees. Part III
will argue that force-feeding punishes detainees in violation of their
right not to be punished prior to adjudication of guilt. Under these
arguments, force-feeding pretrial detainees is unconstitutional.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Colloquially referred to as the “right to die,” individuals have the
right to exert control over their own medical care when they have
become incapacitated.14 Studying the origin of this right—as well
as the history of constitutional rights and hunger striking within
prisons—lays the foundation for understanding why force-feeding
pretrial detainees is problematic.
A. Development of a Fundamental Right
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,15 and
Washington v. Glucksberg,16 the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutional parameters of an individual’s right to act in a way
that will cause death.17 The Supreme Court rooted this right in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantees.18
Both Cruzan and Glucksberg follow a trend of using due process to
protect unenumerated fundamental rights.19 These rights are found
14. Richard A. Leiter, Right to Die, in NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 863, 863 (8th ed.
2019); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-244 A, THE “RIGHT TO DIE”: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY ANALYSIS 3 (2005) (“Although the popular term ‘right to die’ has been used as a
label to describe the current political debate over end-of-life decisions, the underlying issues
include a variety of legal concepts.”).
15. 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990).
16. 521 U.S. 702, 738 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
17. For a broader discussion of the “right to die,” see Yvonne Lindgren, From Rights to
Dignity: Drawing Lessons from Aid in Dying and Reproductive Rights, 2016 UTAH L.REV. 779,
790-92 (2016).
18. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
19. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1510
(1999).
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in the “traditions and conscience of our people.”20 In order to find the
existence of the right, therefore, the Court had to find that there
was a traditional right worth protecting and that it could be artic-
ulated.21
Because substantive due process was used to protect unenu-
merated rights, the road to protecting the right to die started much
earlier than Cruzan. Although each aspect of the right to die de-
bate22 has its own history and justifications,23 the right for an in-
dividual to refuse medical treatment arises out of the common law
doctrine of battery.24 The tort of battery itself is rooted in the
plaintiff ’s dignitary interests and personal autonomy,25 and prior to
the Court’s holding in Cruzan, lower courts analyzed prisoner
starvation cases under similar rationales.26 Force-feeding policies
trace back to 1909,27 but there were no reported decisions regarding
prisoner’s rights until 1982.28 However, the strongest arguments
regarding a prisoner’s right to die came after Cruzan.29
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that a
fundamental right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment existed.
Instead, the Court “assume[d] that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right
to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”30 Nancy Cruzan was
not competent.31 After a car accident left Cruzan in a permanent
20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489 (1965) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
21. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (“We refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted
right can be identified.”).
22. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 14, at 3 (noting that the issues underlying the
right-to-die debate “include a variety of legal concepts”).
23. See id. at 8-27.
24. See id. at 10; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1990).
25. See Craig M. Lawson, The Puzzle of Intended Harm in the Tort of Battery, 74 TEMP.
L. REV. 355, 368 (2001).
26. Mara Silver, Note, Testing “Cruzan”: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of Self-
Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631, 639 (2005).
27. IAN MILLER, A HISTORY OF FORCE FEEDING: HUNGER STRIKES, PRISONS, AND MEDI-
CAL ETHICS, 1909-1974, at 18 (2016) (describing English policies).
28. See Tracey M. Ohm, Note, What They Can Do About It: Prison Administrators’
Authority to Force-Feed Hunger-Striking Inmates, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 151, 155 (2007).
29. See Silver, supra note 26, at 639.
30. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
31. Id. at 265.
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vegetative state,32 her parents requested the hospital cease provid-
ing her with artificial hydration and nutrition.33 While Missouri
recognized that a surrogate could choose to withdraw lifesaving
hydration and nutrition, the state had established safeguards to
ensure that such withdrawal conformed with the patient’s wishes.34
The Supreme Court held that such safeguards did not violate the
U.S. Constitution.35
Although Nancy Cruzan’s parents did not obtain a court order
granting the termination of medical treatment,36 the Court con-
firmed that “a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.”37 Thus,
one can infer such a right from the Court’s other cases.38 The dissent
in Cruzan argued that this acknowledgment did not reach far
enough, emphasizing that self-autonomy rationales meant the
right was fundamental39 (a holding the Court would not reach un-
til Glucksberg).40 Severe consequences never vitiate fundamental
rights:
It is “a well-established rule of general law ... that it is the
patient, not the physician, who ultimately decides if treatment—
any treatment—is to be given at all.... The rule has never been
qualified in its application by either the nature or purpose of the
treatment, or the gravity of the consequences of acceding to or
foregoing it.”41
Traditionally, therefore, surrounding circumstances could not cur-
tail the patient’s ability to refuse medical treatment.
The Court articulated the standard more readily in Glucksberg.
After examining a Washington statute prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide, the Court held that the act of refusing medical
32. Id. at 266.
33. Id. at 267.
34. Id. at 280.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 278.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997).
41. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tune v. Walter Reed Army
Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985)).
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treatment and that of committing assisted suicide were distinct.42
In explaining how, the Court stated that “[t]he right assumed in
Cruzan ... was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of per-
sonal autonomy.... [O]ur assumption was entirely consistent with
this Nation’s history and constitutional traditions.”43 As Glucksberg
reinforced, Cruzan therefore established a broad substantive due
process right to refuse unwanted medical care, specifically lifesaving
hydration and nutrition.
B. Hunger Strikes and the Practice of Force-Feeding
One of the most common reasons a person might refuse food and
water is participation in a hunger strike.44 Hunger striking has long
been used to protest perceived injustices,45 perhaps beginning as far
back as the ancient Celts, when people wronged by the wealthy
would fast on their doorsteps in order to shame them.46 In more
modern times, political actors (such as the suffragettes) have
utilized hunger strikes.47 The hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay,
which has been the source of much continued controversy, included
up to 106 detainees.48 Pretrial detainees are now using hunger
strikes to protest their immigration detainment.49
But what is a hunger strike? “Colloquial definitions” focus on
two aspects: (1) refusal of food and (2) purpose or intent to pro-
test.50 Similarly, the World Medical Association (WMA) considers
competent people to be hunger strikers when they “ha[ve] indicated
42. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
43. Id.
44. See MILLER, supra note 27, at 167 (charting recorded motivations for hunger striking
in English prisons between 1913 and 1940).
45. See Silver, supra note 26, at 633-36 (stating that “[h]unger strikes by prisoners are by
no means a purely modern form of protest” and listing examples of prominent hunger strikes).
46. See Denis O’Hearn, Hunger Strike: The Irish Experience, BIANET (Nov. 5, 2012, 1:32
PM), http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/141857-hunger-strike-the-irish-experience
[https://perma.cc/DJX5-NH2D].
47. See June Purvis, Cat and Mouse: Force Feeding the Suffragettes, HISTORYEXTRA (Nov.
26, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.historyextra.com/period/edwardian/cat-mouse-force-feeding-
suffragettes-hunger-strike/ [https://perma.cc/EAM4-GW53].
48. See MILLER, supra note 27, at 1.
49. See Stein, supra note 9.
50. See Amanda Gordon, Note, The Constitutional Choices Afforded to a Prisoner on
Hunger Strike: Guantanamo, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 345, 349-50 (2011); see also Hunger
Strike, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2005).
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that ... [they have] decided to embark on a hunger strike and ha[ve]
refused to take food and/or fluids for a significant interval.”51
For the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), that “significant in-
terval” is only seventy-two hours.52 The BOP considers a person on
hunger strike if a staff member observes that individual refraining
from eating.53 Procedures generally include placing the hunger
striker in a locked room for close monitoring and subsequent med-
ical evaluation.54
ICE has developed similar standards, which require staff to
monitor the detainee’s health, including measuring such physical
characteristics as height and weight, taking vital signs, and per-
forming urinalysis.55 While ICE recognizes that “[a]n individual
has a right to refuse medical treatment,” the standards specify that
involuntary medical treatment can be administered when “the de-
tainee’s life or health is at risk.”56 The standards also require ICE
to seek a court order before administering involuntary medical
treatment.57
Involuntary medical treatment generally means force-feeding.58
However, few people know what force-feeding really entails.59 The
first step requires the subject to be restrained.60 Then, after lu-
bricating the tubes and providing pain killers in some instances, the
doctor places the feeding tube in the stomach by passing it through
the nasal passage.61 The tube must go down the esophagus and not
the windpipe, which is difficult and may involve the use of addi-
tional technology, such as x-rays.62 Some guidelines state that the
51. Mary A. Kenny, Derrick M. Silove & Zachary Steel, Legal and Ethical Implications
of Medically Enforced Feeding of Detained Asylum Seekers on Hunger Strike, 180 MED. J.
AUSTL. 237, 237 (2004) (quoting WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF MALTA ON HUNGER
STRIKERS (rev. 1992)).
52. 28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (2018).
53. Id.
54. Id. §§ 549.62(b), 63.
55. PBNDS, supra note 12, at 254-55.
56. Id. at 255.
57. Id. at 256.
58. See id. at 253, 256.
59. Esther Inglis-Arkell, Here Is What Really Happens When You Force-Feed Someone,
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procedure takes between twenty and thirty minutes.63 One detainee
explained the procedure in the following words:
They tie us on the force-feeding bed, and then they put a lot of
liquid into the tubes, and the pressure is immense so we end up
vomiting it out.... We can’t talk properly, and we can’t breathe
properly. The pipe is not an easy process, but they try to push it
down our noses and throats.64
This process is repeated, seemingly until the subject agrees to end
the hunger strike or the subject has regained usual body weight.65
Medical complications may also arise during the procedure or
from the long-term effects of repeated force-feeding.66 This can
include damage to the immediate surrounding tissue, infection, and
choking.67 In some circumstances, force-feeding even kills.68
Force-feeding has been subject to intense and sustained criticism.
The WMA declared that a competent prisoner “shall not be fed
artificially.”69 In 2013, many civil rights organizations, including
the American Civil Liberties Union Appeal for Justice, wrote a
joint open letter to the Secretary of Defense calling the practice
“inherently cruel, inhuman, and degrading.”70 That language has
been quoted again in reference to recent immigrant force-feeding in
detention facilities.71 In early 2019, the Geneva-based United Na-
tions human rights office said that the U.S. decision to force-feed
63. JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, MEDICAL MANAGEMENT OF DETAINEES
ON HUNGER STRIKE 18 (2013).
64. Garance Burke & Martha Mendoza, Detainee on Hunger Strike Details Force-Feeding,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/e2ff21606c72407db3197ddf866bd
738 [https://perma.cc/H54Y-TK2J].
65. See, e.g., JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, supra note 63, at 23.
66. ADDAMEER PRISONERS’ SUPPORT & HUM. RTS. ASS’N ET AL., FACTSHEET: FORCE-
FEEDING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MEDICAL STANDARDS 15-16 (2015) [hereinafter
ADDAMEER]; see also Gordon, supra note 50, at 354.
67. ADDAMEER, supra note 66, at 16.
68. When Palestinian prisoners were force-fed in the 1980s, the tubes were mistakenly
inserted in the prisoners’ lungs, causing suffocation and death. Id.
69. WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF MALTA ON HUNGER STRIKERS 3 (rev. 2017).
70. ACLU ET AL., Joint Letter to Chuck Hagel on the Force-Feeding of Hunger-Striking
Prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 2013, 5:03 AM), https://www.hrw.
org/news/2013/05/13/joint-letter-chuck-hagel-force-feeding-hunger-striking-prisoners-guan
tanamo-bay [https://perma.cc/W94S-MRK3].
71. Long, supra note 6.
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immigrant detainees at a detention center in El Paso could violate
the U.N. Convention Against Torture.72
C. Constitutional Rights Within the Prison System
Striking a balance between these competing interests is difficult
for courts. Anyone who has studied constitutional law understands
that “no fundamental right is absolute and the state always has the
opportunity to justify itself.”73 In other words, the government has
an opportunity to explain away any infringement of constitutional
rights.74
Prisons have always been granted great leeway for infringing on
inmates’ constitutional rights because of the unique government
interest in maintaining order in the prison system.75 In fact, nine-
teenth century jurisprudence held that prisoners were “slaves of
the State,”76 and it was a long road for prisoners to establish that
their constitutional rights still applied postconviction.77 Yet pretrial
detainees are not the same as convicted felons because they have not
been tried and their guilt has not been established. Even so, courts
rarely acknowledge the factors distinguishing a pretrial detainee
from a convicted inmate, including how a pretrial detainee’s status
might affect the strength of the argument.78
72. See Owen Daughtery, UN Says US Force-Feeding Detained Immigrants May Violate
Torture Convention, HILL (Feb. 7, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://thehill.com/latino/429039-un-says-
us-force-feeding-of-detained-immigrants-on-hunger-strike-may-violate-torture [https://perma.
cc/XC5U-EFYL]; Garance Burke, UN: US Force-Feeding Immigrants May Breach Torture
Agreement, APNEWS (Feb. 9, 2019), https://apnews.com/e0941d7d1b0d413b9d9a0b792c34dd26
[https://perma.cc/QL7P-JV7C].
73. Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion Bans, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1089, 1117 (2014).
74. See id. This applies to both citizens and noncitizens. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (“The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection
of citizens.”).
75. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990).
76. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (1 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
77. See Grace DiLaura, Comment, “Not Susceptible to the Logic of Turner”: Johnson v.
California and the Future of Gender Equal Protection Claims from Prisons, 60 UCLA L. REV.
506, 513-14 (2012).
78. See infra Part I.C.2. But see Polk Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 421, 428-
30 (Iowa 1999).
694 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:683
1. Courts Have Applied Rationality Standard of Review
Turner v. Safley, decided in 1987, severely increased the govern-
ment’s ability to infringe on prisoners’ fundamental rights by
holding that a rational basis standard was the appropriate standard
of review for prisoners’ constitutional rights.79 Under this standard,
prison officials need only show a rational connection between the
regulation and the objective.80 This standard gives a remarkable
amount of deference to prison officials81—deference that is rarely
available for fundamental rights, which generally require a strict
scrutiny standard.82 Strict scrutiny stands at the opposite end of the
spectrum from rationality review and requires a compelling gov-
ernment interest and narrow tailoring.83 While state regulations
typically fail strict scrutiny, providing significant protection to
individuals, rationality review is much easier to survive—and
sometimes even appears to guarantee the state’s success.84
The Court in Turner applied this standard to two Missouri prison
regulations: a rule that limited inmate correspondence, and a rule
prohibiting inmates from marrying without permission from the
prison warden.85 The Court found that strict scrutiny was inappro-
priate, developing a much more permissive standard for inmates’
constitutional rights—one that required only a reasonable relation-
ship between the regulation and “legitimate penological interests.”86
Applying the standard to the regulations at issue in the case, the
Court found that the correspondence regulation was reasonably
79. 482 U.S. 78, 81, 89-90 (1987).
80. See id. at 89.
81. See United States v. Bout, 860 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In short, both
tests apply a rational basis review.... In conducting this rational basis review, deference is
accorded to the BOP’s determination.”).
82. See Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT.L.REV. 285,
292 (2015).
83. See generally Mariam Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT LAW (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.subscriptlaw.com/blog/levels-of-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/VJ85-E9AY].
84. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving
Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 RICH. L.
REV. 491, 493 (2011) (criticizing the rational basis standard because “allowing any plausible
reason for the legislation to suffice ... has essentially made the rational basis test the
equivalent of no test at all”).
85. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81-83, 89.
86. Id. at 89.
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related but that the marriage regulation—as a complete ban—was
not because it was an “exaggerated response” to the prison’s safety
concerns.87
In other scenarios, the Court has not appeared to question the
rationality standard.88 Specifically, in Washington v. Harper, the
Court recognized that an inmate has a significant liberty interest in
avoiding involuntary antipsychotic medication.89 The Court applied
the Turner standard, finding that this standard of review was
appropriate for “all circumstances in which the needs of prison
administration implicate constitutional rights.”90 Under this stan-
dard, dangerous prisoners could be involuntarily medicated if in
their own medical interest.91
The Court extended Harper to pretrial detainees in Sell v. United
States, stating that a mentally ill defendant who was facing serious
criminal charges could also be involuntarily medicated.92 Instead of
using prison order as the government interest, the Court found the
state’s “interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a
serious crime [was] important.”93 The Court discussed factors for
when the medication is solely recommended to render a defendant
competent to stand trial.94 However, the Court did not discuss how
non-conviction status affected the applicable standard of review.95
2. Legal Distinctions Between Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees
Convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees are incarcerated for
different reasons. The very purpose of incarceration for convicted
criminals is punishment.96 However, pretrial detainees are incar-
cerated because they are not released on bond (either because they
87. Id. at 91, 99.
88. But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (striking down an unwritten
prison policy under which prison officials segregated prisoners according to race because race
did not require compromise).
89. 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1989).
90. Id. at 224.
91. Id. at 227.
92. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003).
93. Id. at 180.
94. See id. at 180-81.
95. See id. at 177-83.
96. See Teresa K. Scarberry, Comment, The Constitutional Right of Pretrial Detainees: A
Healthy Sense of Realism?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1087 (1980).
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have been denied bail or because they simply cannot afford to pay
the bail).97 Although incarceration constitutes punishment for con-
victed criminals, simple temporary incarceration does not constitute
punishment for pretrial98 and immigrant detainees.99 However,
other conditions imposed on detainees while incarcerated could
amount to punishment.100
The Supreme Court case Bell v. Wolfish, decided in 1979,
addressed the constitutionality of detention conditions in a New
York City correctional facility.101 The detainees alleged several
injustices, including body-cavity searches after contact visits.102 In
Bell, the Court rejected the proposition that such invasions
amounted to substantive due process violations because “the
detainee’s desire to be free from discomfort ... simply does not rise
to the level of those fundamental liberty interests” the Court had
discussed in prior cases.103 A principle of accommodation between
constitutional rights and institutional needs “applies equally to
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners ... [because a] detainee
simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincar-
cerated individual.”104 Because pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners posed identical security risks, the Court saw no reason to
treat pretrial detainees any differently.105 This stance has justified
lower courts in failing to account for detainees’ unique status.106
However, even if substantive due process does not provide the
detainee with protection, the detainee still has the right to be free
from punishment under procedural due process.107 This is true even
97. Id.
98. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979).
99. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896); César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1351-52 (2014).
100. See Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 236-37 (finding that the imposition of hard labor on
Chinese immigration detainees amounted to punishment and could not be imposed without
adjudication of guilt).
101. 441 U.S. at 523.
102. Id. at 530.
103. Id. at 534.
104. Id. at 546.
105. Id. at 546 n.28.
106. See, e.g., Casey v. Ellegood, No. 2:11-cv-587-FtM-36SPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165516, at *5-7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding that, under Bell, detainees did not have an
established liberty interest in their “particular classification, prison assignment,” or “cor-
responding restrictions”).
107. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 534-35.
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when an aspect of pretrial detention does not violate an express
guarantee of the Constitution;108 therefore, the prohibition against
punishment still applies even if the state’s behavior does not im-
permissibly infringe on the detainee’s fundamental rights.109
The question then becomes, what is punishment?110 Traditional
purposes of punishment apply in determining whether government
action amounts to punishment.111 In fact, punishment can be as-
certained from the following considerations:
[w]hether the sanction ... comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment—retribution and deterrence, ... whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned.112
Later scholarly formulations of the Bell test reduced it to three
prongs: “(1) whether the detention condition [has] a punitive
purpose; (2) if not, whether there is a legitimate government
interest justifying the condition; and (3) if there is a legitimate in-
terest, whether the condition appears excessive in relation to the
government interest.”113 Therefore, the Bell Court once again
adopted a version of rationality review.114 In formulating this test,
Bell cited several punishment cases,115 including the 1896 case Wong
Wing v. United States, in which Chinese immigrants had been
subjected to hard manual labor.116
108. See id. at 534.
109. See id. at 535-37.
110. The standard prohibiting punishment of pretrial detainees arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. See Kyla Magun, Note, A Changing
Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The Potential Impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-
Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2059, 2069 (2016). Compare U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII, with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
111. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38.
112. See id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
113. See Coleman Gay, Comment, Hour Late on Your Bail, Spend the Weekend in Jail:
Substantive Due Process and Pretrial Detention, 60 B.C. L. REV. 237, 242 (2019).
114. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 536 n.17.
116. See id. at 535 & n.17 (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896)).
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Justice Stevens notably dissented from the majority because he
believed the Bell definition of punishment was too permissive.117 A
rational basis standard gave detainees “virtually no protection” by
reducing the constitutional prohibition against punishment to
“nothing more than a prohibition against ... barbaric treatment.”118
Justice Stevens believed that even the deprivations contested in
Bell amounted to punishment.119
In Fuentes v. Wagner, a case decided in 2000, the Third Circuit
held that a restraint chair did not conclusively amount to punish-
ment.120 However, the court noted that the record contained
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that this was punishment,
including that the chair was “used for behavior modification and
control,” the chair was “used to abate an inmate’s behavior,” and
“there [was] nothing the inmate [could] do to affect the amount of
time [the inmate would] remain in the chair.”121 Determination of
punishment has therefore relied historically upon intent to modify
behavior.122
Recent cases have also focused on excessive force as amounting
to punishment.123 This follows the line of cases beginning with the
punishment formulation in Bell, which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed in Kingsley v. Hendrickson.124 Under the standard artic-
ulated in Kingsley, pretrial detainees need only show that the force
used against them was excessive under an objective standard, not
that the state actor applying the force was subjectively aware of the
unreasonableness.125
Therefore, in summary, pretrial detainees have a fundamental
right under Cruzan to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.126
When pretrial detainees choose to hunger strike, the government
typically responds by force-feeding, which is a degrading and
117. Id.
118. Id. at 585-86.
119. Id. at 595.
120. 206 F.3d 335, 343 (3d Cir. 2000).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See Prisoners’ Rights, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1131, 1179-80 n.3124
(2018).
124. 576 U.S. 389, 396-98 (2015).
125. Id. at 396-97.
126. See supra Part I.A.
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painful process that carries associated health risks.127 Under Turner
and its progeny, the Court has applied a rational basis standard of
review to the prison’s actions, despite the fact that these actions
implicate a fundamental right that should be protected under sub-
stantive due process.128 Lastly, pretrial detainees are protected
under procedural due process from being punished prior to adjudi-
cation of guilt.129 Therefore, the test for whether a detainee has been
punished arises out of the Bell standard,130 and the government’s
force-feeding practice implicates this standard.131
II. ADOPTING A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF SCRUTINY FOR
INFRINGEMENTS UPON A PRETRIAL DETAINEE’S FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT NOT TO BE FORCE-FED
Pretrial detainees have a fundamental right, as articulated un-
der Cruzan, to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.132 Force-
feeding constitutes a shocking invasion of this privacy interest.133
The only countervailing state interest that could possibly account
for this invasion is the government’s interest in maintaining prison
order.134 Other alternative state interests, such as force-feeding
detainees to preserve them for trial, fall short because detainees are
generally competent when they strike.135 Because the invasion is so
shocking, and because of detainees’ unique pretrial status, the
government should be required to meet a heightened level of scru-
tiny before force-feeding pretrial detainees.
A. Force-Feeding Constitutes a Shocking Invasion of Pretrial
Detainees’ Fundamental Rights
When the Supreme Court briefly considered pretrial detainees’
privacy interests in Bell, the Court rejected the argument that the
127. See supra Part I.B.
128. See supra Part I.C.1.
129. See supra Part I.C.2.
130. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Part III.
132. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
133. See supra Part I.B; infra Part II.A.
134. See infra Part II.B.
135. See infra Part II.B.3.
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alleged violations comprised unconstitutional violations of the
detainees’ rights to bodily integrity.136 In making this decision, the
Court assumed the detainees’ complaints arose from a “desire to be
free from discomfort.”137 Still, the prison regulation requiring body-
cavity searches gave the Court “pause” and caused them to require
more support for this practice than for the other nonphysical
practices.138 If a body-cavity search was enough to give the Court
concern, then forcible insertion of a feeding tube into a detainee’s
body should cause courts to stop approving force-feeding altogether.
This practice causes much more than discomfort.
The process of force-feeding is physically painful.139 Any charac-
terization of the procedure as uncomfortable is a gross and likely
self-serving understatement,140 particularly in light of the myriad
prisoner accounts describing the experience.141 Although unneces-
sary to reestablish that the procedure infringes upon a fundamental
right,142 it is relevant to note that force-feeding would likely pass
the older “shocks the conscience” test established in Rochin v.
California.143 There, the police forcibly extracted the contents of the
suspect’s stomach in a way that was “bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities.”144 The parallels from Rochin to force-feeding are
unmistakable: instead of removing the contents of an individual’s
stomach, the government is forcing contents in.145
Courts should consider the severity of this infringement when
balancing detainees’ interests against the government’s purported
interest. Doing so would allow courts to consider and respect both
interests, as courts frequently modify fundamental rights without
eliminating the rights entirely.146 One such example against which
force-feeding has been compared is free speech, where the govern-
ment may restrict the exercise of the right with appropriate time,
136. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 558.
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 7.
141. See generally MILLER, supra note 27.
142. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
143. See 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
144. Id.
145. See Joel K. Greenberg, Note, Hunger Striking Prisoners: The Constitutionality of
Force-Feeding, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 750 n.26 (1983).
146. See, e.g., id. at 766 (discussing freedom-of-speech constraints).
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place, and manner regulations while still leaving open alternative
avenues of expression.147 Force-feeding is vastly different because it
constitutes “an ‘all or nothing’ intrusion.”148 Therefore, the right
either exists or the government extinguishes that right: prisons
cannot force-feed someone halfway. In this way, it bears marked
similarities to the marriage regulation in Turner, in which the
Court responded negatively to a regulation that almost amounted
to a complete ban.149 Therefore, courts should remember that this
type of infringement lacks any built-in safety provisions. Once
approved, the strings are cut.
Although force-feeding is a shocking infringement, the Supreme
Court never intended to extend the Cruzan right to incompetent in-
dividuals.150 This restriction exerts pressure on physicians to ensure
competency. If there are generally more mental health concerns in
prison,151 and if lack of trust between physicians and patients
compounds these concerns,152 physicians may be handicapped in
determining whether detainees are competently exercising their
rights.153 Although prisons likely do have more authority in deter-
mining whether a prisoner is making a competent decision, once a
detainee has been deemed competent, courts should be careful when
evaluating any government interests purported to countervail this
fundamental right.
147. Id.; see also Rebecca A. Taylor, The First Amendment, A.B.A. (July 1, 2014), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2014/july_2014/the_first_
amendment/ [https://perma.cc/Q69J-9644].
148. See Greenberg, supra note 145, at 766.
149. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987).
150. Force-feeding incompetent individuals does not raise the same constitutional con-
cerns. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990).
151. See Anisha Lewis, Incarceration and Mental Health, CTR. FOR PRISONER HEALTH &
HUM.RTS., https://www.prisonerhealth.org/educational-resources/factsheets-2/incarceration-
and-mental-health/ [https://perma.cc/U8JH-SFQC].
152. See Frederick R. Parker & Charles J. Paine, Informed Consent and the Refusal of
Medical Treatment in the Correctional Setting, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240, 244 (1999).
153. See id. at 248 (noting that “the free world template, which tips the scales in favor of
patient autonomy, does not necessarily fit the prison mold,” and arguing for heightened
scrutiny for consent).
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B. The Government Should Be Required to Provide More Proof of
Its Interests in Force-Feeding Under a Heightened Scrutiny
Standard
The only government interest that can likely support force-
feeding of pretrial detainees is maintaining order within the prison
system.154 Although courts often discuss a series of other inter-
ests—including “preserving life, ... [p]rotecting the interests of
innocent third parties, [and m]aintaining the ... integrity of the
medical profession”155—maintaining order is the only interest that
does not simultaneously exist for unincarcerated individuals.156 If
force-feeding is not a generally acceptable practice outside of the
prison context, which it is not,157 then only those rationales entirely
peculiar to prisons should ever be compelling to courts. The state
does not try to force-feed (or even litigate) cases in which competent,
154. See Greenberg, supra note 145, at 770. Although there are many interests that prison
officials could proffer to support force-feeding (limited only by officials’ imaginations and the
facts of the cases), maintaining prison order is the superstar and is usually mentioned first.
See, e.g., Abdulmutallab v. Sessions, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35915, at *23 (D. Colo. Mar. 6,
2019); McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257, 1265 (Wash. 2008). Furthermore, to the
extent that another interest is mentioned—such as preserving life—that interest is generally
related to maintaining order. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Saenz (In re Saenz), 728 N.W.2d
765, 771 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (“If prisoners were allowed to kill themselves, prisons would find
it even more difficult than they do to maintain discipline, because of the effect of a suicide in
agitating the other prisoners.” (quoting Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546-47 (7th Cir.
2006))). Lastly, the Supreme Court has endorsed this interest. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”). Life is perhaps
mentioned as a close second to prison order and security. See Lantz v. Coleman, No.
HHDCV084034912, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 621, at *64 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2010);
Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). However, that
interest in this context is flawed. See infra note 159.
155. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 421, 426-29 (Iowa 1999).
156. See, e.g., Steven C. Sunshine, Note, Should a Hunger-Striking Prisoner Be Allowed to
Die?, 25 B.C. L. REV. 423, 440-43 (1984).
157. For example, experts advise parents to avoid force-feeding their children because of
the negative psychichological effects such behavior can have on children’s development. See
Raj Raghunathan, The Nurturer’s Curse: Why Force-Feeding Kids Backfires and Tips on
Kicking the Nasty Habit, PSYCH. TODAY (Mar. 5, 2014), https://psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
sapient-nature/201403/the-nurturers-curse [https://perma.cc/Q2ZB-AZMG]; Pressure to Eat,
CHILD FEEDING GUIDE, https://www.childfeedingguide.co.uk/tips/common-feeding-pitfalls/ pres
sure-eat/ [https://perma. cc/VCQ2-9XA5].
2020] FORCE-FEEDING PRETRIAL DETAINEES 703
unincarcerated adults refuse to eat.158 If interests such as preserv-
ing life (which is supremely important)159 are not enough to permit
the state to force-feed competent adults outside of prison,160 then
only maintaining order inside those prisons remains an option for
argument.
In evaluating the government’s interest in prison order as ap-
plied to pretrial detainees, it is important first to acknowledge the
general lack of evidence supporting the argument that force-feeding
prevents riots and copycats.161 Once that is acknowledged, it be-
comes clear that the government has an alternative: releasing
pretrial detainees on bail, which would reduce detainees’ desire to
hunger strike and also relieve the prison of certain medical re-
sponsibilities.162 Lastly, the differences between force-feeding and
involuntary medication indicate that the government is acting
beyond its scope as a detainment entity with regards to pretrial
detainees.163
158. Hunger strikes outside of prison are rare; when they occur, the government typically
does nothing. See, e.g., Paige Skinner, A Local Woman Is Staging a Hunger Strike Until
Netflix Renews ‘The OA,’ L.A.MAG. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.lamag.com/culturefiles/save-
the-oa-strike/ [https://perma.cc/JU6C-DH2S].
159. Nothing in this Note should imply that human life is not valuable. Life is precious.
160. See supra note 157. Force-feeding competent adults in order to preserve life is pater-
nalistic at best. See supra Part II.A. At worst, it deprives detainees of the rights recognized
under Cruzan, in which case preservation of life did not compel a different outcome. See supra
Part I.A. Furthermore, hunger striking’s purpose is not suicide—it is symbolism. Compare
Vinay Kumar V, Irom Sharmila: Manipur’s Iron Lady Or Mengoubi (The Fair One), FEMINISM
IN INDIA (Mar. 13, 2020), https://feminisminindia.com/2020/03/13/irom-sharmila-manipurs-
iron-lady-mengoubi/ [https://perma.cc/G4HY-2C54] (detailing Irom Sharmila’s incredible story
of hunger striking and being force-fed for sixteen years as she became “a symbol, an icon, and
a beacon of hope for her resilience”), with Nancy Schimelpfening, Why Do People Commit
Suicide?, VERYWELL MIND (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/why-do-people-
commit-suicide-1067515 [https://perma.cc/9KWZ-Z2FE] (providing reasons for suicide, in-
cluding mental illness and hopelessness). Therefore, the separate purposes of hunger striking
and suicide, combined with the lack of doctrinal support in Cruzan, should reduce any court’s
willingness to rely on this government purpose.
161. See infra Part II.B.1.
162. See infra Part II.B.2.
163. See infra Part II.B.3.
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1. Little Evidence Suggests that Force-Feeding Prevents Riots
and Copycats
Prisons typically posit their interest in maintaining prisoner
order in one of two ways: (1) the hunger strike will incite riots, and
(2) the hunger strike will encourage copycats.164 Courts have ac-
knowledged each of these interests;165 however, many courts have
permitted simple speculation to suffice.166
When riots occur, the effects can be devastating, and prison
officials are careful about watching for riot warning signs.167 If
hunger striking causes rioting, then the interest in preventing
rioting could countervail a detainee’s fundamental right.168 How-
ever, the logical link between hunger striking and rioting is not
clearly delineated. Prison officials believe that allowing an inmate
to starve to death would be the spark.169 One famous example of
rioting occurred after the death of Bobby Sands, a man who was
allowed to starve to death while imprisoned in Northern Ireland; no-
tably, however, the rioting occurred outside the prison.170 Courts
generally do not cite specific prison riots that hunger strikers in-
cited as justification for force-feeding inmates.171 At the pretrial
stage, this is a particularly cogent fact. Pretrial detainees are
(theoretically) being held only for a short time, and emotional ties
are less likely to develop between detainees in the same way that
164. See Silver, supra note 26, at 648.
165. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 421, 430 (Iowa 1999).
166. See Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[A]rguments concerning the effect of [the inmate’s] conduct are nothing more than
speculation and conjecture.”). Although beneficial that at least some courts have required a
greater showing from the government, one of the judicial system’s greatest virtues is
consistency. See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect
Constitutional Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293, 303 (2018).
167. See generally BERT USEEM, CAMILLE GRAHAM CAMP, GEORGE M. CAMP & RENIE
DUGAN, RESOLUTION OF PRISON RIOTS 1-4, 7 (1995), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/prisriot.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5KN3-PV27].
168. See Greenberg, supra note 145, at 765.
169. See id.
170. See Steven C. Bennett, Note, The Privacy and Procedural Due Process Rights of Hun-
ger Striking Prisoners, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1208-09 nn.335-36 (1983) (arguing that force-
feeding is equally disruptive); MILLER, supra note 27, at 2.
171. See Silver, supra note 26, at 649. But see Feaster v. Mueller, No. 1:18-2705-JMC-SVH,
2018 WL 6045263, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2018) (noting that plaintiff claimed that hunger
strikers caused the riot from which he was charged with assault).
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they might for convicted prisoners who potentially serve the length
of their sentences with the same people. Therefore, if copycatting
is a questionable justification for convicts living out long prison
sentences, it is even more unstable as justification for pretrial
detainees.
Furthermore, scholars have argued that force-feeding itself dis-
rupts the prison environment.172 It is a costly procedure,173 and
medical staff have to monitor the detainee throughout the hunger
strike.174 Monitoring itself can be disruptive as detainees can be
isolated or transferred to a medical facility.175 In fact, force-feeding
might cause a riot if detainees feel that prisons are threatening
their personal autonomy.176 Disruption of this sort may pose a
greater risk in the pretrial context because, without a determination
of guilt, detainees may believe on a personal level that they have a
greater right to such autonomy. Beyond such hypotheticals, how-
ever, public criticism indicates that the government’s response to
hunger striking is just as likely to incite passionate responses as the
reasons detainees give for the hunger strike.177
It is also unclear that force-feeding prevents copycats. Force-
feeding may actually encourage copycats “if they know they will not
have to pay the ultimate price of death.”178 Hunger striking can also
be a very private thing. For instance, although several hunger
strikers grouped together in the ICE facility in El Paso,179 Ivanov
fasted alone.180 Furthermore, the simple fact that a copycat exists
should not be threatening to the government; after all, other fun-
damental rights—such as free speech—are more robust when many
people exercise the right, or, in other words, the right becomes more
developed and defined through the litigation process.181 Therefore,
without additional facts to support the government’s interest in
172. See Bennett, supra note 170, at 1208-09 nn.335-36 (arguing that force-feeding is
equally disruptive).
173. See id. (noting a $100,000 cost to force-feed an inmate in a 1983 case).
174. See PBNDS, supra note 12, at 254.
175. See id. at 255.
176. See Silver, supra note 26, at 651; Bennett, supra note 170, at 1209 n.336.
177. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
178. Silver, supra note 26, at 650.
179. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119
(1989) (setting out justifications supporting free speech).
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prison order, courts should not find that interest sufficiently com-
pelling.
2. The Availability of Bond as an Alternative to Confinement
Undermines the Government’s Interest in Force-Feeding
Detainees
The fact that bond is a valid alternative for pretrial detainees
further undermines the government’s position.182 Detainees, like
convicted prisoners, are often housed in jails.183 However, while both
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees are housed in jails, they
are typically not housed together.184 Separation allows the state “to
provide the most appropriate prison conditions for each category of
detainees.”185 With ICE detainees, the different housing is even
more obvious as those detainees are held in entirely separate
detainment facilities.186 As such, the state has the obligation to
assess the risks differently for each group.187 For the purposes of
this assessment, detainees are unique because of the nature of a
hunger-striking prisoner’s demands and the relative seriousness of
the crime, which together make bail a reasonable alternative to
force-feeding.
First, the nature of detainee demands during a hunger strike
differs from convicted prisoners. While convicted prisoners gener-
ally attack conditions of confinement (targeting prison reform),188
182. See Alex Nowrasteh, Alternatives to Detention Are Cheaper than Universal Detention,
CATO INST. (June 20, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/alternatives-detention-are-
cheaper-indefinite-detention [https://perma.cc/B96B-PQLJ].
183. See, e.g., Michael Haugen, In Rural Areas, Jail Populations Are Skyrocketing—
Including Pretrial Detainees, TEX.PUB.POL’Y FOUND. (July 3, 2018), https://www.texaspolicy.
com/in-rural-areas-jail-populations-are-skyrocketing-including-pretrial-detainees/ [https://
perma.cc/S9ZE-48FA].
184. See 28 C.F.R. § 551.104 (2020).
185. Separation of Detainees, DETENTION FOCUS, https://www.apt.ch/en/knowledge-hub/
detention-focus-database/safety-order-and-discipline/separation-detainees [https://perma.cc/
4WWL-G6P9].
186. See Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/
detention-management [https://perma.cc/4WJ2-XHG7].
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., Julia Conley, With US Prison Strike on Third Day, Reports of Hunger Strikes
and Work Stoppages Nationwide, COMMON DREAMS (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.common
dreams.org/news/2018/08/23/us-prison-strike-third-day-reports-hunger-strikes-and-work-
stoppages-nationwide [https://perma.cc/VJ78-Z6TK].
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pretrial detainees often protest being held indefinitely (demanding
their own cases be heard).189 A clear example is provided with ICE
detainees, of whom fewer and fewer detainees are being released on
bail.190 While in 2016, 43.7 percent of bond hearings were denied, by
2019, that number had risen to 51.6 percent.191 Bail-reform advo-
cates have also collected data regarding the increase for state
courts. One case study reports that in the last twenty years, Texas’s
ratio has grown from one out of three defendants being held pretrial
to three out of four.192 If the government is serious about reducing
hunger strikes among detainees, then the government can be more
generous in granting bond.
While the government might fear that detainees would then use
bond as a way to manipulate the system—which seems to be a
common concern with courts193—such a fear should not be so
compelling as to give the state license for an invasion of such
magnitude. In Bezio v. Dorsey, a justice for the New York Court of
Appeals believed her colleagues had decided the case based on the
prisoner’s intent to manipulate the system.194 Of the inmate, she
said, “He was undoubtedly manipulative, but all civil disobedience
is manipulative. Manipulativeness, obviously, is not a sufficient
predicate for forced feeding by the State.”195
Second, the seriousness of the crimes of which detainees are
accused has changed significantly since the Court’s holding in Bell.
When Bell was decided in 1979, the Court noted that detention was
necessary “because no other less drastic means” ensured appearance
at trial because detainees either had prior records or had been
189. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 9.
190. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
191. See Immigration Court Bond Hearings and Related Case Decisions, TRAC IMMIGR.,
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/bond/ [https://perma.cc/KV2R-VZCH]. Although this
represents a steady rise in denials over the last several years, this is not the highest on rec-
ord. See id.
192. See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, & BAIL PRACS., BAIL REFORM: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE BASED ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE 63 (2019).
193. See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 389 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the
inmate had a right to refuse nutrition but refusing to condone attempts to manipulate the
prison system); Polk Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 421, 431 (Iowa 1999) (noting
that in most cases, inmates’ primary goal is to manipulate the prison system).
194. 989 N.E.2d 942, 960 (N.Y. 2013) (Lippman, J., dissenting).
195. See id.
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charged with “serious crimes.”196 However, bail is no longer reserved
for only violent criminals; in fact, one scholar has noted that pol-
icies surrounding detainment have turned it “into a modern-day
debtor’s prison.”197 When release is based on financial status, rather
than a prediction of violence, the risk of violent rioting seems
obscure. The risk seems particularly obscure with ICE detainees, of
whom 58 percent have no criminal record.198 Only 20 percent have
been convicted of a felony, and the most frequent crime is illegal
entry followed by conviction for driving under the influence.199
Generally speaking, ICE detainees are not committing the “serious
crimes” that the Court likely contemplated in Bell.200
Lastly, advances in technology have made physical detention less
necessary. One of the options frequently touted as an alternative is
electronic monitoring.201 If the government has a choice between
placing people on house arrest or violating their constitutional
rights, that violation looks even less reasonable; the government
cannot argue that it had no alternative to achieve its objectives.202
Therefore, if detainees are hunger striking most frequently in an
attempt to secure bond more easily, and if detainees at large are
charged with less serious offenses, the fact that bail exists under-
mines the reasonableness of any government interest in force-
feeding detainees.
196. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 n.28 (1979).
197. See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment,
& the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1318-21 (2012).
198. See Profiling Who ICE Detains—Few Committed Any Crime, TRAC IMMIGR. (Oct. 9,
2018), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/530/ [https://perma.cc/B6NU-366A].
199. See id.
200. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 n.28. Even if the detainee has a violent history, scholars and
judges have seriously questioned the accuracy of any predictions of future violence. See
Appleman, supra note 197, at 1336-40.
201. See Jesse Kelley, Opinion, Active Electronic Monitoring a Viable Alternative to Pretrial
Detention, HILL (June 18, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/392857-
active-electronic-monitoring-a-viable-alternative-to-pretrial [https://perma.cc/KH8S-Q4EP].
202. See Nowrasteh, supra note 182.
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3. Government Interest in Preserving a Detainee’s Life to Trial
Another motivation lurks in the background here, and that is one
originating from Harper and Sell.203 Although never applied to force-
feeding cases, Sell allowed a detainee to be medicated in order to
render him competent to stand trial.204 Trial interests are important
interests on the part of the government.205 However, the difference
between involuntary medication and involuntary nutrition is sig-
nificant.
An active-passive distinction exists between these two scenarios.
Hunger striking is a voluntary and affirmative action, while a
mentally ill inmate does not choose psychosis.206 One court phrased
it this way:
[M]ental illness sometimes robs a person of the capacity to make
informed treatment decisions. Only when a court finds that a
person is incompetent to make informed treatment decisions do
we permit the state to act in a paternalistic manner, making
treatment decisions in the best interest of the patient.207
Therefore, while an inmate suffering from psychosis is incompetent,
a hunger-striking inmate must already be competent in order to
assert a fundamental right at all under Cruzan.208
Furthermore, ethical concerns arise from preserving a life simply
to exact punishment in the future.209 This is most clearly seen in the
medication-for-execution cases.210 Force-feeding a person for trial is
similarly questionable. After all, because the detainee remains in
state custody both before and after any criminal adjudication,
assuming that the detainee is found guilty, some might argue that
203. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 227 (1990).
204. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179.
205. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
206. See, e.g., Julie D. Cantor, Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the Psychotic
Inmate when Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 119, 123 (2005).
207. See Steele v. Hamilton Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 21 (Ohio 2000).
208. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
209. See Brian C. Kalt, Death, Ethics, and the State, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 534
(2000).
210. See id.
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force-feeding has punitive intent itself.211 However, while the Sell
Court was concerned detainees might be “free[d] without punish-
ment” if the state does not medicate them, that same fear does
not exist for detainees who are on hunger strike.212 An interrupt-
ing stage happens between detainment and trial, which is the de-
tainee’s own choice; whatever decision hunger-striking detainees
make, they do not end up in the outside world before they stand
trial.
Lastly, Sell applies only to criminal defendants “facing serious
criminal charges.”213 In deciding this, the Court cited a “human need
for security.”214 In many cases, detainees are not charged with
crimes that require the government to reassure its citizens that life
in this country is still safe.215 For example, ICE detainees charged
with immigration crimes are usually nonviolent.216 More broadly,
the majority of state pretrial detainees are likely held for nonviolent
offenses.217 The fact that many detainees are not held for serious
charges undermines the government’s interest in force-feeding as a
general rule without a heightened level of scrutiny, and the govern-
ment’s desire to preserve a detainee’s life to trial actually under-
mines its stated interest in maintaining order.
In conclusion, the government clearly has other interests besides
prison order at play; if the government were truly interested only in
prison order, the fit between the stated interest and reality would
not be so loose. In other areas of the law, the Supreme Court has
been willing to find that the Turner standard is not appropriate and
that a heightened standard of review should apply.218 This should be
one such area: heightened scrutiny should be required before the
government is permitted to force-feed detainees. Heightened scru-
tiny would allow the courts to review whether the government has
211. See infra Part III.A.
212. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
213. See id. at 179.
214. See id. at 180.
215. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Josh Crawford, New Data Shows Large Number of Pretrial Detainees Are
Non-Violent, Low Risk, PEGASUS BLOG (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.pegasuskentucky.org/
single-post/2019/10/01/New-Data-Shows-Large-Number-of-Pretrial-Detainees-are-Non-
Violent-Low-Risk [https://perma.cc/PQ7M-PRBU].
218. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005).
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proven that the hunger strike triggered its interest in safety and
security, and thereby ensure that detainees’ fundamental rights are
not infringed upon based on hypothetical and unsupported fears.
III. FORCE-FEEDING AS PUNISHMENT
If a detainee’s pretrial status is not sufficient to gain a heightened
level of scrutiny for substantive due process rights, then the fact
that pretrial detainees cannot be punished prior to adjudication of
guilt under procedural due process should provide additional pro-
tection. Procedural due process requires the federal government to
provide certain procedural safeguards whenever it denies a person
life, liberty, or property.219 Therefore, punishment is prohibited
without the additional process of adjudication of guilt.220 If a pretrial
detainee does not succeed based on the substantive due process
analysis, then procedural due process should impede the state’s
ability to force-feed detainees. This Section argues first that force-
feeding will always constitute punishment, thereby triggering due
process rights, and second that current hearings are insufficient to
render force-feeding constitutional.221
A. Force-Feeding Meets Traditional Punishment Objectives,
Displaying Government’s Punitive Intent
Under the Bell test, if the state expresses punitive intent in its
treatment of a detainee, then its actions violate the detainee’s due
process rights.222 Although some courts have held that the state’s
actions are facially legitimate and do not (on their face) express
punitive intent,223 force-feeding reveals punitive intent on the part
of prison officials because it serves the traditional punishment
219. See Procedural Due Process, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012).
220. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Johnson v. Recoder, No. 18-cv-00366-
WHO, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62056, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2020) (citing id.).
221. Although this Note argues that current hearings are not sufficient, and therefore
additional process is due, it is beyond the scope of this Note to itemize this additional process.
222. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535; Gay, supra note 113, at 242.
223. In re Khatri Chhetri Sher Bahadur, No. EP-19-CV-00357-DCG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33455, at *30 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020).
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rationale of deterrence224 and because prison officials require a
finding of scienter on the part of detainees.225
1. Deterrence
When the Court defined punishment in Bell, the Court stated that
if the activity promoted traditional punishment goals—including
that of deterrence—then the activity could constitute punishment.226
Deterrence can be understood as happening at two levels: specific
deterrence, which targets the individual offender, and general de-
terrence, which targets a population at large.227 As a result of the
government action—either observed or felt—the individual is less
likely to engage in the bad behavior.228 In the context of hunger
striking, force-feeding meets this definition perfectly.
First, force-feeding results in specific deterrence. Once the gov-
ernment begins force-feeding, a detainee has only two options:
either stop striking and agree to consume food again, or continue to
endure the force-feeding. As one observer noted, “[T]here are only
two options in the final analysis.... Either the inmate has to
surrender the ... commitment, or else the prison [forces food]
through [the inmate’s] nose.”229 And this works: people stop hunger
striking.230 In this way, force-feeding mirrors the facts of Fuentes v.
Wagner, in which the Third Circuit examined a restraint chair that
was “used for behavior modification and control.”231 Thus, the policy
of force-feeding operates as an effective coercive weapon for “sub-
duing recalcitrant prisoners.”232
Historical data reveals just how coercive force-feeding really is.
Between 1913 and 1940, 44 percent of hunger strikers abandoned
their hunger strike after being force-fed just once; 70 percent
224. See infra Part III.A.1.
225. See infra Part III.A.2.
226. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963)).
227. See Kelli D. Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,
80 FED. PROB. J. 33, 33 (2016).
228. See id.
229. Benjamin Pi-wei Liu, Comment, A Prisoner's Right to Religious Diet Beyond the Free
Exercise Clause, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1151, 1171 (2004).
230. See MILLER, supra note 27, at 153.
231. 206 F.3d 335, 343 (3d Cir. 2000).
232. See MILLER, supra note 27, at 155.
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abandoned the strike within the first day of being force-fed.233 Only
21 percent of hunger strikes lasted beyond two days of force-
feeding.234 This coercive effect is reflected in modern instances of
force-feeding. Ivanov voluntarily agreed to resume eating within a
day after ICE obtained an Emergency Temporary Restraining Order
granting the agency license to force-feed him.235 The individuals who
choose to stage hunger strikes are not weak-minded individuals; to
the contrary, refusing food is a painful process in its own right.236 If
the additional pain of force-feeding is more intense, then how can it
not be wholly inappropriate as a tool of persuasion in a civilized
society?
Prisons are interested not only in deterring the hunger strike
itself but also in deterring the show of autonomy and bid for change
that a hunger strike represents. Courts are particularly concerned
with any attempt that prisoners make to influence the system.237
The Appellate Court of Illinois notably held that a prison could
force-feed hunger strikers “whose only purpose is to attempt to
manipulate the system.”238 In other words, a successful hunger
strike could result in real change.239 Therefore, prisons use force-
feeding to deter both a specific hunger striker’s action and the
underlying purpose for that action.
Fear over manipulating the system also goes to force-feeding’s
purpose of general deterrence. Prison administrators frequently cite
copycats as one of their fears,240 claiming that copycats disrupt
prison order.241 In Stouffer v. Reid, the Court of Special Appeals of
233. See id. at 161-62.
234. See id. at 162.
235. Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigr. &
Customs Enf ’t v. Ivanov, No. 3:19-cv-01573-DMS-MDD (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2019); supra note
1 and accompanying text.
236. See Monte Morin, The Science Behind the Anguish of a Hunger Strike, L.A.TIMES (July
3, 2013, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/science/la-sci-hunger-striker-20130703-dto-html
story.html [https://perma.cc/3TEP-4J8M].
237. See supra note 193; see also Silver, supra note 26, at 654.
238. People ex rel. Ill. Dep’t of Corr. v. Millard, 782 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
239. See Alizeh Kohari, Hunger Strikes: What Can They Achieve?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 16,
2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14540696 [https://perma.cc/K3JL-TKT5].
240. See Silver, supra note 26, at 648.
241. See Polk Cnty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 421, 430 (Iowa 1999) (discussing
“the chief jailer’s concerns that other inmates would ‘copycat’ [the inmate] as an excuse to get
out of jail”).
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Maryland refused to extend its holding, which permitted an inmate
to forego dialysis, to prisoners who were attempting to manipulate
prison policies or officials.242 The court clarified,
[The] appellee’s circumstances are limited and personal. Where
inmates attempt to manipulate a prison official or policy by
refusing to eat because all inmates have to eat and any one of
them could go on a hunger strike, permitting one inmate will
encourage or incite other inmates to refuse to eat in order to
achieve a given objective.243
Therefore, the government has not been shy about acknowledging
that deterrence is a major incentive in force-feeding. Even if force-
feeding does not effectively deter copycats,244 the government has
expressed punitive intent. Under the Bell test, this is sufficient to
qualify force-feeding as a legal punishment.245
Another tangential reason the government may wish to deter
hunger strikers is public relations. At common law, prisons have a
duty to care for their inmates246—and today, the public regards
prisoners as deserving of healthcare247 and voices criticism when
quality healthcare is too expensive for them to afford.248 The stage
is set for mass public criticism when the detainee requiring health-
care is a hunger striker because every response leaves the govern-
ment vulnerable to negative publicity. If the government allows a
detainee to die in custody, the government risks drawing national
attention to the incident and the message the hunger striker
intended to convey.249 If the government force-feeds a detainee, that
also is subject to public backlash.250 It would be far easier for the
242. 965 A.2d 96, 110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).
243. Id.
244. See supra Part II.B.1.
245. See Gay, supra note 113, at 242.
246. See Bennett, supra note 170, at 1199.
247. See Joseph E. Paris, Why Prisoners Deserve Health Care, AMA J. ETHICS (Feb. 2008),
https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/why-prisoners-deserve-health-care/2008-02
[https://perma.cc/2EHN-25EW].
248. See Wendy Sawyer, The Steep Cost of Medical Co-Pays in Prison Puts Health at Risk,
PRISON POL’YINITIATIVE (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/19/copays/
[https://perma.cc/EL8K-LF5T].
249. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 27, at 96 (noting fear that a death would bolster public
support); Silver, supra note 26, at 643.
250. See, e.g., Long, supra note 6.
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government to just deter detainees from going on strike than to deal
with this catch-22 scenario.
The government’s concern over the release of force-feeding
information highlights how concerned the government is about
public relations, even though public relations is never an interest
articulated in any force-feeding cases.251 In 2014, a federal judge
ordered public accessibility for videos depicting the force-feeding of
Guantanamo Bay detainees.252 After a nine-month delay, the judge
chastised the Department of Justice lawyers for requesting still
more time.253 This effort highlights the government’s motive in
deterring the underlying detainee behavior.
2. Finding of Scienter
The government does not require that the inmate intended to
engage in a hunger strike when treating the inmate as such, but
intent seems to be implied.254 The very definition of hunger striking
implies competency and a motive behind the prisoner’s actions—as
does common sense.255 However, incorporating that motive into the
legal analysis transforms hunger striking into a pseudo crime with
force-feeding as its punishment.
In Bell, the Court noted that if government action “comes into
play only on a finding of scienter,” that action could be considered
punishment.256 Historically, scienter—or criminal intent—formed
an element of every common law crime.257 Although BOP and ICE
regulations do not solely come into play after the government
251. See Silver, supra note 26, at 643 (noting the absence of public relations in state
interests).
252. Cora Currier, Judge Orders Government to Release Videos of Guantanamo Force-
Feedings, INTERCEPT (Oct. 3, 2014, 4:22 PM), https://theintercept.com/2014/10/03/judge-orders-
government-release-videos-guantanamo-force-feedings/ [https://perma.cc/WB8P-BLKL].
253. Sam Sacks, “Move Forward!” Judge Slams Government Delay in Releasing Gitmo
Force-Feeding Videos, INTERCEPT (July 9, 2015, 2:24 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/
09/going-move-forward-judge-slams-government-delay-tactics-releasing-gitmo-force-feeding-
videos/ [https://perma.cc/BQ2M-LQEZ].
254. See PBNDS, supra note 12, at 254; supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
255. Many reasons exist for hunger striking. See MILLER, supra note 27, at 167.
256. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1979) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
257. William J. Sloan, Note, The Development of Crimes Requiring No Criminal Intent, 26
MARQ. L. REV. 92, 92 (1942).
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determines that the detainee intended to engage in a hunger strike,
the regulations require that prison officials refer the hunger striker
to medical personnel.258 One objective in referring the hunger striker
is to assess whether the detainee is acting deliberately.259
However, this inquiry is relatively passive; after all, intent to
engage in a hunger strike is relevant for psychiatric-treatment
purposes.260 Not only are these evaluations critical to ensuring the
detainee is making a competent and informed decision, but they also
assist prisons in identifying and treating any potential underlying
medical issues.261 Furthermore, prisons would likely find it difficult
to avoid knowing inmates’ reasons for hunger striking because
prisoners want their demands to be known.262 Therefore, this
inquiry may be insufficient in itself to meet the scienter require-
ment in Bell.
But the government’s own policies are not the only arena in which
the government interest is visible. Courts consistently mention the
hunger striker’s motivation in judicial opinions, revealing just how
important perceived motivations are to the government’s position.263
In Williams v. Miller, the Tenth Circuit noted that the prisoner had
previously resorted to manipulation tactics.264 In People ex rel.
Department of Corrections v. Fort, a state court noted that the
“defendant's hunger strike was intended to manipulate [the prison]
into improving his conditions while incarcerated.”265 A New York
appellate court judge in Dorsey warned against this tendency to
import scienter when she said that an intent to manipulate should
not give the state license to force-feed.266 Therefore, even if the
government has not officially stated that scienter is required, courts’
258. See 28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (2010); PBNDS, supra note 12, at 254.
259. See PBNDS, supra note 12, at 254.
260. See Marlynn Wei & Rebecca W. Brendel, Psychiatry and Hunger Strikes, 23 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 75, 93-95 (2010).
261. See id. at 87-88, 95.
262. See, e.g., Prisoners’ Demands, PRISONER HUNGER STRIKE SOLIDARITY (Apr. 3, 2011),
https://prisonerhungerstrikesolidarity.wordpress.com/education/the-prisoners-demands-2/
[https://perma.cc/9BPU-MZ6N].
263. See, e.g., Williams v. Miller, 696 F. App’x 862, 868 n.13 (10th Cir. 2017); People ex rel.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Fort, 815 N.E.2d 1246, 1250-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
264. 696 F. App’x at 868 n.13.
265. 815 N.E.2d at 1251.
266. See Bezio v. Dorsey, 989 N.E.2d 942, 960 (N.Y. 2013).
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holdings indicate that scienter is implicit in force-feeding, showing
that it conforms to traditional definitions of punishment.
B. Excessive Nature of the Government Response Indicates that
Force-Feeding Constitutes Punishment
If the traditional definitions of punishment discussed above—
deterrence and the finding of scienter—are not sufficient to qualify
force-feeding as punishment, then the Bell test provides for a fur-
ther classification.267 Without punitive intent, the government must
have a legitimate interest in force-feeding and force-feeding must
not be excessive in relation to that interest,268 as objectively
determined.269 The validity of that government interest has been
discussed at length above.270 However, even if that government
interest is found to be legitimate, force-feeding is an extreme
reaction. It may even rise to the level of “barbaric treatment” that
Justice Stevens discussed in his Bell dissent.271 This becomes par-
ticularly clear in light of medical ethics and international law.
Medical ethics make it clear that the state’s reaction is objectively
extreme because force-feeding is generally not authorized for any
competent adult except prisoners.272 The WMA has strongly spoken
out against the practice.273 Furthermore, physicians—who ought to
develop a relationship based on trust with their patients—violate
their patients’ trust by participating in force-feeding:
Creating and maintaining trust precludes any role of the
physician as an agent of or acting on behalf of the authorities to
convince the hunger striker to stop the strike or to threaten the
striker with adverse consequences of a refusal. Any imposition
by authorities of a “medicalized” solution to a hunger strike by
asking a physician to seek to induce a prisoner’s compliance with
authorities’ requirements or tell the hunger striker to either end
267. See Gay, supra note 113, at 242.
268. See id.
269. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015).
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 586 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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the hunger strike or be force-feed [sic], undermines trust,
perhaps irretrievably.274
Rational government action should not require physicians to violate
their patients’ trust. Therefore, because it is so contrary to the
normal doctor-patient dynamic, force-feeding seems to indicate that
the government has hijacked the medical interest of the defendant
to compel an exaggerated response to the actual medical issue.275
In addition to violating the sacred trust between doctor and
patient, the low standard of care may cause harm in contravention
of the Hippocratic Oath.276 The Hippocratic Oath instructs physi-
cians to act only “for the benefit of the sick.”277 A short-hand is often
used: “First, do no harm.”278 However, when ICE force-fed an
asylum-seeker from Nepal, the procedure almost killed him.279 One
doctor, a professor of emergency medicine, was “horrified at the
dramatically substandard care being provided,” which “ would never
be tolerated in any other setting.”280 In fact, after reviewing ICE’s
policy and the record, the judge noted “the government barely es-
tablished that the ICE policy, as applied to respondent, does not
amount to punishment.”281 The judge was particularly concerned
with ICE’s inattention to treatment details.282 Therefore, when the
274. See INST. ON MED. AS A PROFESSION, ETHICS ABANDONED: MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM
AND DETAINEE ABUSE IN THE WAR ON TERROR 91-92 (2013).
275. Sometimes inmates argue that doctors actually exaggerate prisoners’ medical con-
ditions in order to justify force-feeding them. See, e.g., Randolph v. Wetzel, No. 19-CV-2231,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104647, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2019).
276. The Hippocratic Oath, GREEK MED., https://nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html
[https://perma.cc/DXH8-JENV].
277. Id. (emphasis added).
278. Robert H. Shmerling, First, Do No Harm, HARV.HEALTH PUBL’G (June 22, 2020, 12:00
AM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/first-do-no-harm-201510138421 [https://perma.
cc/2PA7-7MS4].
279. Travis Bubenik, As Feds Force-Feed Another Hunger Striker, Judge Raises Concern,
COURTHOUSE NEWSSERV. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/as-feds-force-feed-
another-hunger-striker-judge-raises-concern/ [https://perma.cc/3HEC-VL94].
280. Robert Moore, ICE Has Force-Fed Asylum Seeker in El Paso for Almost 3 Months,
TUCSON SENTINEL (Mar. 4, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://www.tucsonsentinel.com/nationworld/
report/030420_asylum_hunger_strike/ice-has-force-fed-asylum-seeker-el-paso-almost-3-
months/ [https://perma.cc/NA8A-MHAU].
281. See In re Khatri Chhetri Sher Bahadur, No. EP-19-CV-00357-DCG, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33455, at *31 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020) (emphasis added).
282. See id. at *3.
2020] FORCE-FEEDING PRETRIAL DETAINEES 719
treatment being provided is both brutal and poorly implemented, it
is unnecessary and therefore excessive.283
When applied to pretrial detainees—particularly those ICE
detains—other medical scenarios may also affect the detainees’
decision to initiate a hunger strike.284 Asylum-seekers, who are
undergoing a rigorous review process, often present psychological
symptoms, such as “anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress
disorder.”285 The length of detention plays into these psychological
concerns.286 As discussed above, many ICE-detainee hunger strikes
are actually just an attempt to resolve uncertainty.287 Because pre-
trial detainees are frequently reacting out of uncertainty, the
physician should address corresponding psychological issues rather
than comply with the government’s disproportionate force-feeding
reaction.
Occasionally, the government has argued that medical ethics
weighs in favor of force-feeding.288 Some judges are unwilling to
accept that argument—particularly in light of developments such as
the WMA declaration.289 However, other courts have imposed legal
liability on healthcare professionals who have refused to partici-
pate in force-feeding because of their ethical responsibilities.290 In
all probability, this distinction comes down to precedent—too few
courts have been willing to say that force-feeding violates medical
ethics, even in the face of evidence that it does.291
Not only does medical ethics indicate force-feeding is an extreme
reaction, international law supports this as well. On the balance,
international laws do not support “force-feeding ... prisoners without
283. Excessive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2020) (defining “excessive” as “exceeding what is usual,
proper, necessary, or normal”).
284. See Wei & Brendel, supra note 260, at 83-84.
285. See id. at 83.
286. See id.
287. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257, 1266 (Wash. 2008).
289. See, e.g., id. at 1274 (Sanders, J., dissenting); see also Comm’r of Corr. v. Coleman, 38
A.3d 84, 110 (Conn. 2012) (citing McNabb, 180 P.3d at 1268 (Sanders, J., dissenting) among
others).
290. See Azadeh Shahshahani & Priya Arvind Patel, From Pelican Bay to Palestine: The
Legal Normalization of Force-Feeding Hunger-Strikers, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 12 (2018).
291. See Coleman, 38 A.3d at 110 (noting that opinions citing the WMA declarations lack
precedential value and do not reflect a consensus about how courts view these declarations).
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medical consent.”292 Some countries—notably the United Kingdom—
have officially acknowledged a prisoner’s right to starve.293 Further-
more, force-feeding as punishment violates every relevant inter-
national treaty, including the Geneva Convention.294 If such is the
international perspective, domestic force-feeding likely does not
constitute a reasoned and proportional response to a hunger
strike.295
Not only do medical ethics and international laws highlight the
extremity of the government’s reaction, but also the host of other
issues discussed in this Note cement the fact. One court has
eloquently summarized the current standard: “[I]t is not enough for
us to say that force-feeding may cause physical pain, invade bodily
integrity, or even implicate petitioners’ fundamental individual
rights. This is a court of law, not an arbiter of medical ethics.”296
Such a comprehensive list should not be ignored. These consider-
ations reveal that force-feeding is an extreme reaction constituting
punishment under the Bell standard.
C. Court Hearings as Adjudication
Generally, ICE requires its officials to get a court order prior to
force-feeding a detainee,297 and prisons follow suit.298 Some may
argue that this qualifies as adjudication and therefore provides
sufficient due process, even if force-feeding constitutes punishment.
However, hearings as they currently stand are not sufficient be-
cause these hearings do not address the detainee’s guilt.299 Because
292. See Gordon, supra note 50, at 370.
293. See Silver, supra note 26, at 635 (noting that Britain officially recognizes a prisoner’s
right to starve).
294. See George J. Annas, Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the Global War
on Terror, 87 B.U. L. REV. 427, 431, 455-56 (2007).
295. Some scholars have called force-feeding torture. See, e.g., Sumer Dayal, Prosecuting
Force-Feeding: An Assessment of Criminality Under the ICC Statute, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
693, 704-05 (2015).
296. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
297. See PBNDS, supra note 12, at 256.
298. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE CORR.&CMTY.SUPERVISION, DIRECTIVE: INMATE HUNGER STRIKE
(2019), https://doccs.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2020/02/4309.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5GY-
BWQK].
299. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
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hunger striking is not a crime, these hearings cannot result in a
finding of guilt.
Any court hearings currently taking place are not sufficient for
due process. Punishment is prohibited prior to an adjudication of
guilt.300 Guilt is not a subject of these hearings.301 Although these
hearings might address issues likely to arise based on infringement
of constitutional rights,302 even if those infringements are ultimately
unconstitutional,303 the hearings do not adjudicate guilt. Using the
ICE order granted in Evgenii Ivanov’s case as an example, the order
does not use terminology consistent with guilt and innocence.304
Guilt cannot be the subject of these hearings because guilt
requires “[a] legal determination of criminal responsibility ... that
an individual or entity has violated the criminal law.”305 Therefore,
a legislative body must actually prohibit behavior before guilt
becomes a possibility. There is no criminal law prohibiting compe-
tent people from refusing hydration and nutrition; if it were, such
law would be out of step with Cruzan.306 No person can be guilty of
a crime that does not exist. Such a principle is obvious from the
void-for-vagueness doctrine, under which crimes not clearly defined
have no power.307 Not only do vague laws provide reasonable citizens
no warning that their actions will result in punishment, but they
also allow for arbitrary actors to inflict punishment for impermis-
sible reasons.308 Absent some law under which to adjudicate guilt,
no hearing—regardless of the thoroughness of the evidence—can
300. See id. at 535.
301. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t v. Ivanov, No. 3:19-cv-
01573-DMS-MDD, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2019). To the extent punishment is
mentioned in these hearings, the government focuses on fitting the force-feeding into the non-
punishment box. See, e.g., In re Khatri Chhetri Sher Bahadur, No. EP-19-CV-00357-DCG,
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33455 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2020).
302. See, e.g., Ivanov, slip op. at 2 (“The Court finds that [ICE] is likely to succeed in
showing that its interest in preserving life and discharging its duties to care for those in its
custody outweigh any interest Defendant might have in expressing himself through a hunger
strike.”).
303. See supra Part II.
304. See Ivanov, slip op. at 3.
305. Guilt, BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012).
306. See supra Part I.A.
307. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (noting that the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is a “basic principle of due process”).
308. See id.
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find it. Because force-feeding pretrial detainees is punishment,
these hearings are not enough to cloak the action in legality.
CONCLUSION
Evgenii Ivanov stopped his hunger strike within a day of the
court granting ICE’s request to force-feed him.309 Ivanov is certainly
not the only detainee to have stopped so abruptly.310 Other detainees
have recounted the horrible pain associated with force-feeding.311
Such action is clearly coercive. It also violates a detainee’s funda-
mental right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. This truly
is “inherently cruel, inhuman, and degrading” treatment.312 The
practice is also tragically unnecessary with pretrial detainees
because of the additional flexibility such status grants the govern-
ment for problem-solving. Therefore, the government should be
required to show more than just the possibility that the hunger
striker will cause disruption and disorder.
Furthermore, pretrial detainees are protected from punishment
prior to adjudication of guilt.313 Force-feeding, which is brutal and
painful, has obvious deterrent effect on hunger-striking and is
unconstitutional. The government should not be permitted to treat
detainees like convicted prisoners, without consideration for their
separate status and constitutional protection. If the government
does so, then defendants truly are guilty without a chance to prove
their innocence. Tragically, they are guilty only of exercising their
rights.
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